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The Subjects of Justice 
Evan Simpson 
What are the basic subjects of justice-individuals and their actions, 
societies and their basic institutions, or something else again? In the 
absence of an answer to this conceptual question, substantive disputes 
among political theories remain unresolved.' 
If, as John Rawls says, "the primary subject of justice is the basic 
structure of society,"2 a just society may include many acts of apparent 
inequity to individuals, for social intrusions into the lives of everyone will 
likely be justified by principles defining a fair share of the social product. 
If, however, the subject of justice is identified more clearly in Robert 
Nozick's assertion that "individuals have rights," personal entitlements 
may provide immunity from assault by principles of specifically social 
justice.3 The contest between modern, interventionist liberalism and 
libertarianism is thus inseparable from the problem of the subject of 
justice. 
The disagreement is neither well defined nor resolvable until other 
possible subjects of justice are canvassed. Both the idea of justice to 
individuals and the idea of just social structures are significantly am- 
biguous. They interfere with clear perception of the matter of justice- 
the problems of power and domination, freedom and oppression, which 
are raised by conflicts of interest. A catalog of such conflicts indicates the 
inadequacy of both liberalism and libertarianism. As individualist 
theories of justice they lack the conceptual resources for mapping im- 
portant areas of the domain of right action, notably that of class conflict. 
I. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
Justice is wanting when one person or one set of interests dominates 
another without justification. This is the unifying thread among several 
1. See Hugo Adam Bedau, "Social Justice and Social Institutions," Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 3 (1978): 159-75. 
2. John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 
p. 7. 
3. See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. ix, 
204-9. 
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types of conflict of interest which can be distinguished according to their 
respective subjects. 
1. Conflict within a Community of Interest 
Aristotle discerned "a community of interest . . . between master and 
slave, when both of them naturally merit the position in which they 
stand. But the reverse is true [and there is a conflict of interest and 
enmity] when matters are otherwise and slavery rests merely on legal 
sanction and superior power."4 In general, a veritable community of 
interest exists when each person's social position corresponds to his real 
merit, so that if there are relationships of natural superiority and in- 
feriority they define a proper institutional ordering among individuals. 
Superior and inferior then share a common interest in maintaining the 
arrangement, not merely because to do otherwise would be to sacrifice 
mutual advantage but also because it would be to lack touch with reality, 
and it is in no one's interest to live in ignorance or illusion. 
Social hierarchies can be just if they correspond to natural superi- 
orities, since domination may then be justified. Superiorities need not be 
natural, however, in order to provide such justification. Wherever there 
are identifiable species of merit and excellence, those qualities define a 
common interest which should be served in preference to the private 
aims and individual dispositions which lack any justifying reasons. If 
Rousseau is right, merit and excellence are social rather than natural 
qualities, since they arise solely from "artificial sentiments," but once 
such modes of evaluation do arise they reflect genuine communities of 
interest.5 Criteria of beauty and dexterity, for example, even if artificial, 
provide a standard by which one's interest in social position and recogni- 
tion can be assessed and one's quest for these goods justified as war- 
ranted or condemned as baseless. Such appraisal is possible because the 
social standards in question remain tied to realities which are in- 
dependent of individual judgment and preference. 
Communities of interest are not always hierarchies, of course, since 
equality, too, is a relationship. Citizenship and many friendships are 
relationships of equals in which seeking privileged position may be to 
violate the relationship and to act wrongly. For equals to demand more 
than an equal share is a paradigm of injustice because it constitutes a 
repudiation of the rational standard which justifies each person's interest 
in an equal division. The crucial point about communities of interest, 
however, is not whether they are composed of equals or unequals or 
whether assertions of superiority and inferiority are tested against a 
natural or a social standard. It is the more general point that any just 
4. Aristotle, Politics, trans. E. Barker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 
20-21. 
5. Jean Jacques Rousseau, The First and Second Discourses, ed. R. D. Masters (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1964), pp. 134-35, 146-49. 
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community must rest upon realities which determine whether the 
domination of some by others is justified. Within such communities con- 
flicts of interest are conflicts with those realities. 
2. Conflict among Private Interests 
Since a community of interest is defined by the existence of certain 
interest-justifying truths, there is no such community but only sets of 
private interests when no independent standards for evaluating interests 
are identifiable. Under such circumstances the possibility of imposing 
domination upon another can no longer be admitted because there is no 
satisfactory justification for it. Thus, Locke follows Aristotle in noting 
that domination is oppressive, hence unjust, when it has a counterfactual 
foundation, but he rejects the legitimacy of involuntary subjection on the 
grounds that nothing known to human beings warrants such a re- 
lationship. Regarding political domination, for example, he observes 
that since God did not "by any manifest Declaration of his Will set one 
above the other" there is no "undoubted Right to Domination and 
Sovereignty." Because, in general, relationships of "Subordination and 
Subjection" are no part of our natural condition, any domination not 
agreed to is oppression, and justice must originally consist in each per- 
son's having "perfect freedom" and not "depending upon the Will of any 
other Man."6 Any subsequent subordination of one interest to another 
must depend upon agreements between people rather than upon truths 
identifiable independently of consensual relationships. 
The natural equality which exists together with freedom in the state 
of nature is not a relationship of the sort existing between citizens and 
friends. Independence, in Locke's sense, is an absence of the common 
interests which constitute a community of interest identified by natural 
or social facts. In the place of communities, therefore, one finds protec- 
tive alliances which are sustained by a coincidence rather than a union of 
individual interests. Since each person's reason for the arrangement 
derives from interests which are not themselves amenable to appraisal, 
the only possible conflicts of interest are those involving the uninvited 
imposition of one person upon another. In consequence, the only un- 
justifiable expressions of an interest are assault upon the unappraisable 
interests of others and, since agreements freely arrived at give others a 
legitimate interest in their execution, the breaking of such an agreement. 
3. Conflict with Institutions 
Because the violation of an agreement is the violation of an interest, 
justice to individuals extends to agreements between persons and from 
them to social institutions. Following Rawls, institutions may be regarded 
6. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. P. Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1967), p. 287. 
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as constitutive conventions-as public systems of rules which define of- 
fices and positions with their rights and duties.7 Systems of government, 
of property, and the family are constituted by the basic rules which 
govern them, and, like other conventions, they consist in patterns of 
behavior maintained as if by agreements -the "tacit agreements" of so 
much liberal literature. 
It is clear that institutions need justification, for rules impose con- 
straints and their enforcement can be just only when the constraints are 
justified. The need for justification is clearest when institutions dominate 
life in ways plausibly characterized as oppressive because they express 
social requirements which are unsanctioned by individual consent. They 
are then inimical to freedom in the ways so compellingly described by 
J. S. Mill and, given the relationship between conventions and agree- 
ments, should be made compatible with what individuals regard as in 
their own interests. 
The need for justifying social institutions is recognized in attempts 
to test the authority of constitutive rules by appeal to social utility or to 
rational principles of right. Concerned specifically with institutions as a 
subject of justice, such appeals identify the crucial common feature of 
Locke's natural right theory, Mill's utilitarianism, Rawls's contractarian 
view, and Nozick's entitlement theory. All of these accounts exclude 
consideration of the natural or social standards presupposed by com- 
munities of interest and describe ways of adjudicating among interests 
rather than of determining whose interests are correct. That they should 
do so is entirely appropriate, given any characterization of institutions as 
servants of private interests for which questions of justification do not 
arise. Just as surely, however, they define a general viewpoint which does 
not provide an adequate command of the concept of justice, for there 
are conflicts of interest which they cannot even discern. 
4. Class Conflict 
Conflicting class interests define a subject of justice distinct from in- 
stitutions. A mark of the difference is the way in which class domination 
is commonly justified by unsatisfactory appeals to dubious or obscure 
realities rather than by means of the utilitarian and consensual legitima- 
tions characteristic of accepted social practices. We now regard Aristot- 
le's defense of slavery as founded upon counterfactual claims of natural 
superiority, and it has often been remarked that medieval social hierar- 
chies were justified by religious and moral dogmas rather than by utility 
or rational self-interest. Such appeals may be so successful in disguising 
antagonisms as communities of interest that the opposition goes un- 
recognized even within classes that have the common interest in freedom 
7. Rawls, pp. 55-56, 344. 
8. David K. Lewis, Convention (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 
88. 
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implied by their unjustified domination. The way in which class conflict, 
unlike conflict with institutions, may go unrecognized and an oppressed 
class remain only a virtual community of interest signifies the dis- 
tinctively structural or systematic character of such domination. 
Modern class conflict is tied to a distinction between money as a 
medium of exchange and money as a commodity. The distinction itself is 
ancient. Aristotle distinguished two forms of the art of acquisition-one, 
"necessary and laudable," which permits gaining natural and useful 
products through exchange, and another which "makes a profit from 
currency itself, instead of making it from the process [i.e. of exchange] 
which currency was meant to serve"-a profit which is "made at the 
expense of other men."9 Dealings such as simple usury, however, do not 
entail class conflict, and Aristotle seems to condemn the "unnatural" 
mode of acquisition primarily for engendering conflicts within a com- 
munity of interest. In depicting a civilization without such community, 
furthermore, Locke is able to maintain that the transformation of a 
means of exchange into a commodity merely extends an accepted in- 
stitution and cannot, therefore, constitute injury to anyone. The distinc- 
tion between two forms of money or acquisition can, therefore, be used 
to identify a conflict of class interests only if it is redescribed in a way 
which identifies structural distinctions ignored by Locke. Marx does this 
in an account of the counterfactual justification of the system of 
capital-as opposed to the conventions of currency and exchange. 
Exchange transactions are no more inherently objectionable than 
any other form of voluntary, beneficial, rule-governed activity.'0 But 
whereas conventions of exchange need not involve any conflict of inter- 
est, in the system of capitalistic transactions "the relation of exchange has 
... dropped away entirely, or is a mere semblance."" The money system is 
misrepresented as a system of exchange because its characteristic feature 
is a continual net transfer of value from labor to capital. The expropria- 
tion of wealth from wage labor by capital finds apparent justification in 
the uncoerced agreement between employee and employer, but since 
that justification ignores the relationship between the working and the 
capitalist classes it is insufficient. A form of unjustified domination re- 
mains, and the extraction of value from labor arguably constitutes 
exploitation and injustice. 
Since individual workers are free to strike a bargain with individual 
capitalists, the concept of class is essential for sustaining the judgment of 
injustice here.12 Domination does not occur between individuals, nor 
9. Aristotle, p. 35. 
10. See Karl Marx, Grundrisse, trans. M. Nicolaus (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 
pp. 465-67. 
11. Ibid., p. 458. 
12. For an illustration of this fact see Allan W. Wood, "Marx on Right and Justice: A 
Reply to Husami," Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 (1979): 267-95. 
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does it occur between individuals and the institution of exchange. It 
occurs only between classes. If this is so, then class conflict is irreducible 
to other forms of opposition, and the legitimacy of social microphe- 
nomena-such as the interpersonal transactions which establish 
individual entitlements to property-must be balanced against the in- 
justice of important macrophenomena. The existence of class exploita- 
tion is evidence against the justice of the capitalist system, however justly 
that system may have arisen through a series of historical transactions. 
To complain about the unfairness of measures to alter such a historical 
result is then hopelessly myopic,13 while suggestions that "the primary 
subject ofjustice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way 
in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and 
duties" conflate importantly different subjects and hinder the critique of 
social systems. 
II. SOCIAL STRUCTURES 
A distinction between social structures and basic institutions which is 
sufficient for undermining liberal and libertarian theories of right must 
distinguish classes from social groups and patterns of ownership. While 
class societies will tend to display patterns of privileged appropriation 
which generate superior life prospects for members of favored economic 
groups, it is as simplistic to characterize the major constituents of such 
societies as "hostile camps" as it is now false to refer to "naked, shame- 
less, direct, brutal exploitation" of one class by another.14 Models of 
classes as cohesive groups, appropriate though they are in popular 
tracts, imperil the truths they represent when they are conflated with the 
actual structures they portray.15 While Marx was hardly immune to this 
confusion, his theoretical works tend to depict capital and labor as 
abstractions and as identical to the capitalist class and the working class, 
respectively.'6 These social classes, like logical classes, are, therefore, 
themselves properly regarded as abstractions rather than as groups de- 
finable in terms of their membership. 
Only by distinguishing structural phenomena from the subjects of 
empirical sociology can a clear and plausible concept of class domination 
be formulated. It is quite conceivable that there should be a general 
diffusion of ownership of the means of production among the members 
of a population. The joint-stock character of the modern corporation, 
13. See Nozick, pp. 204-7. 
14. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (Moscow: Prog- 
ress Publishers, 1975), pp. 41, 45. 
15. The conflation is, of course, a common one (see, e.g., Kai Nielsen, "Class and 
Justice," in Justice and Economic Distribution, ed. John Arthur and William H. Shaw 
[Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.], p. 228). For a sustained illustration of the 
difficulty in getting clear about classes see Alan Hunt, ed., Classes and Class Structure (Lon- 
don: Lawrence & Wishart, 1977). 
16. Marx, pp. 104-8, 464. 
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the early instances of which so impressed Marx, has, indeed, taken us 
some distance in this direction. There is, therefore, no logical reason 
why the membership of the working class and the capitalist class should 
not coincide, but a society so organized would be far from classless. 
Under a system of private ownership there would continue to be a net 
transfer of wealth and power from labor to capital. That is to say, crucial 
investment decisions would be made by private interests, and production 
would remain oriented to exchange values. Nothing would decisively 
check the proliferation of useless and harmful products or the manipu- 
lation of consumer preference, and the difficulty of exerting social con- 
trol over production would continually increase with the growth of pri- 
vate productive capacity. Capital, hence the capitalist class, but not a 
group of plutocrats, dominates such a society. 
In political thought, more than anywhere else save religion, impor- 
tant conceptual discoveries harden into orthodoxies in which they are 
mistaken for historical truths. Failure to appreciate the distinction be- 
tween impersonal structural oppositions and their various possible man- 
ifestations, unfortunately, leads to confused sectarian disputes about 
strategies of action and to shallow external charges of descriptive failure. 
While classes may correspond to relatively discrete groups, the abstract 
structural feature need not exhibit itself in this way. To insist that class 
conflict must consist in a fight between oppressor and oppressed is, in a 
liberal era, to be guided by a mirage and doomed to political impotence. 
The image of overt struggle misrepresents the nature of the conflict. 
According to Marx, the worker sells his "particular expenditure of 
force to a particular capitalist, whom he confronts as an independent 
individual. It is clear that this is not his relation to the existence of capital 
as capital, i.e. to the capitalist class.... Everything touching on the indi- 
vidual, real person leaves him a wide field of choice, or arbitrary will, and 
hence of formal freedom."'17 Formal freedom is freedom; it is a con- 
ventional counterpart of Locke's freedom, namely, independence of the 
will of any superior authority, augmented by the institution of exchange 
which makes unfettered economic transactions possible. While such in- 
stitutional freedom entails that there need be no conflict of interest 
between individual worker and individual owner, however, it lacks a 
structural analogue, for the steady augmentation of "objectified labor" 
by capital is clearly no voluntary relationship. 
Criteria of justice which hold for all transactions between individu- 
als may be unsatisfied at the structural level. The truism that "a person 
who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in 
transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the 
holding,"'18 evidently lacks application to the transfer between labor and 
17. Ibid., p. 464. 
18. Nozick, p. 151. 
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capital. Of course, a class is not a person, and it is unsurprising that a 
principle for assessing personal transactions should be silent upon the 
macroscopic transfer emerging from a complicated set of individual ac- 
tions. But insofar as such a transfer occurs and insofar as there are, 
therefore, identifiable classes between which it occurs, silence bespeaks a 
serious limitation upon the generality of the principle and lack of provi- 
sion for dealing with structural conflicts of interest. 
No less seriously, a conception ofjust acquisition and transfer which 
is limited to individual transactions confers apparent legitimacy upon 
unsound arguments. A description confined to microscopic transfers 
conveys the impression that in order to prevent gradual growth of pri- 
vate property a socialist society would have to "forbid capitalist acts be- 
tween consenting adults."'9 Clearly, though, capitalist acts can occur only 
where there is a capitalist class, and individual exchanges include no 
such presupposition. The prohibition of classes through measures de- 
signed to preserve collective decision making does not, therefore, entail 
repressive restrictions upon individual initiative. It restricts only the un- 
intended, cumulative effects of such initiative. Only reticence about 
classes leads to suggestions of conflict between individual liberty and 
public self-determination. 
The same silence is incumbent upon Rawls, even though he does not 
appear to eschew macroscopic analysis. Principles of justice for in- 
stitutions are naturally represented as describing the social structures to 
which basic institutions should conform, but the difference principle, for 
example, does not at all address the structural feature of class domina- 
tion. Because classes are, in principle, distinct from patterns of individ- 
ual ownership, no redistribution of social goods among representative 
persons need alter the underlying structure of domination. 
This limitation is inherent. In seeking principles of justice Rawls's 
rational contractors are constrained from probing beneath distributive 
justice and arguing as follows: "I may belong to a class society. In order 
to defend myself against such a system of unjustified domination I must 
formulate a principle which requires important social decisions to be 
made democratically. Since such decisions include the investment of 
resources, that principle should exclude private control of the major 
means of production." Rawls's contractors cannot so reason because, 
although they are concerned about the social and economic groups into 
which they may fall, they are not aware of class distinctions. The exis- 
tence of classes is not among what Rawls considers "the general facts of 
human society," for members of dominated classes have a common 
interest in freedom and no grasp of common interests is possible for the 
independent strategists who seek an acceptable contract for them- 
selves.20 The cornerstone of liberal individualism-the idea that interests 
19. Ibid., p. 163. 
20. For a related argument see Evan Simpson, "Socialist Justice," Ethics 87 (1976): 
7-14. 
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are ultimately private and unjustifiable-precludes identifying social re- 
alities whose existence entails the contrary. For liberalism there are only 
interest groups, not classes or communities of interest. 
To deny the existence of classes is to beg the question in favor of 
individualist theories ofjustice. A better reply to the complaint that such 
theories are blind to social structures would, therefore, be that class 
conflicts are not a subject ofjustice. Principles ofjustice are not deficient 
for lacking application to cases in which no questions ofjustice arise, and 
even the socialist tradition provides strong arguments against the ascrip- 
tion of injustice to capitalism. If there is an objection to be made, 
perhaps, it is that the system is unfree, not that it is unjust.2' 
A consequence of that freedom which is simply independence of the 
domination of other men is the replacement of personal relationships by 
material or external ones. "In the money relation, in the developed 
system of exchange . . . , the ties of personal dependence . . . are in fact 
exploded ... and individuals seem independent . . . , free to collide with 
one another and to engage in exchange within this freedom. . .. [But] 
here also individuals come into connection with one another only in 
determined ways. These objective dependency relations also appear, in 
antithesis to those of personal dependence . . . in such a way that individ- 
uals are now ruled by ... material relations. ." . When in this way 
money relations supplant personal relations and anonymous class domi- 
nation replaces political class rule,23 there is no longer any evident dom- 
ination of men by other men, and ascriptions of injustice seem in- 
appropriate. Insofar as the system of exchange has become an in- 
dependent structure within which individuals must act, it can still seem 
oppressive, but that limitation upon freedom seems no more unjust than 
the unjustified domination of man by nature. 
Because capital is a social artifact, freedom cannot be severed from 
justice in this manner. Given the equation between injustice and any 
unjustified domination of some interests by others, the value of freedom 
for persons so dominated entails the value of justice. Since class conflicts 
reflect such domination, social structures are correctly regarded as sub- 
jects of justice. Since, more particularly, capitalist class domination is to 
be understood in terms of the suppression of public interests by private 
ones, members of the public can plausibly be said to have a justified 
interest in economic democracy-in collective determination of the use 
to which primary productive resources are to be put. And because con- 
trol is the salient aspect of ownership, class conflict entails the justice of 
social ownership of the major productive resources. A theory of justice 
which ignores classes may permit socialism, but a theory which rec- 
ognizes them requires it. 
21. See George G. Brenkert, "Freedom and Private Property in Marx," Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 8 (1979): 122-47. 
22. Marx, pp. 163-64. 
23. SeeJirgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), pp. 20-21. 
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III. PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Property rights define the boundaries of justice, for justice is giving 
everyone his own, that is, his property. Unjustifiable conflicts of interest 
arise when persons are deprived of their property, since such actions 
deny them their rights. Property, however, is a complex concept defined 
by a number of distinguishable rights. An individualist theory of justice 
will fail to discriminate them all, for it will prevent arguing that, since 
class domination is unjust, oppressed classes are wronged and some 
forms of property constitute solely a social right. 
Let no one deny that property is a natural right. It is a right which 
follows from the human freedom and equality which become apparent 
once cultures are freed from traditional ties of obligation and the claims 
which justified those bonds of dependence are rejected as false. So long 
as a community survives and is not dissolved into a system of merely 
material dependencies its members remain related-but, with the dis- 
appearance of baseless standards of superiority and inferiority, only as 
equals. Each person becomes an independent agent rather than the 
instrument of another. To be such an agent is to have the right to use 
one's body as one wishes; that is, to have personal property in one's body 
and its use, hence the right to exclusive control over them. In short, the 
natural right to property is equivalent to the distinctness of individuals, 
and the libertarian defense of property thus rightly identifies a central 
aspect of our idea of a person. 
This natural right to property derives, however, from our moral 
and social relationships rather than from a libertarian axiom of personal 
autonomy, and it defines an extremely attenuated form of property. 
While property of this primitive sort must include a right of appropri- 
ation-or else the right to the use of one's body, one's labor, would be 
meaningless-it does not include a clear right to private accumulation. 
Still less does it include a right to transfer one's rights to others. Natural 
rights are inalienable, since they could not be transferred without de- 
stroying that distinctness of individuals which they define, but a concep- 
tion of property which includes further rights needs further argument. 
The rights to accumulate goods and transfer them constitute a use- 
ful extension of the concept of property, and their justification resides 
largely in that usefulness. Under conditions of relative scarcity, at any 
rate, they are conducive to comfort and security in addition to bare 
subsistence. Since, however, property in what can be accumulated and 
alienated is not defined by natural rights, it must be understood in terms 
of the rules constitutive of an institution. For reasons cataloged by Locke 
and Hume, we tacitly agree that surpluses and transfers are to be permit- 
ted, accepting rules which define new rights to amass and exchange 
goods on the assumption that the observance of these rules promotes the 
growth and spread of well-being. 
The constitutive nature of these rules shows that exchanges between 
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persons are not acts of elementary freedom but ones which are embed- 
ded in a matrix of general understandings of a distinctive kind. The 
rules make possible transactions, such as giving, which would otherwise 
lack the character of an exchange and amount only to one person's 
ceasing to control a thing and another person's appropriating it anew. 
They are also subject to evolution. When existing conventions cease to 
seem generally beneficial and no longer command approval, the rules 
are properly qualified or rewritten in order to restore the viability of the 
institution. There is no permanent right to conventional forms of prop- 
erty, for as Locke notes, "I have truly no property in that, which another 
can by right take from me, when he pleases, against my consent," and 
this consent, Locke observes, is to be identified with "the Consent of the 
Majority."24 One enjoys the rights of an institution only at the pleasure 
of the participants, since without their assent the conditions for the 
existence of those rights do not exist. 
Although human freedom entails only very circumscribed rights to 
property, there do arise apparent antagonisms between the collective 
conditions of property and the individual right to it. It is easy to describe 
circumstances under which the rules enabling acquisition of certain 
rights by individuals cease to be justifiable, but the redefinition of rights 
warranted by such circumstances may be unjustifiable given that the 
existing rights were justly acquired. The problem cannot always be re- 
solved by giving compensation for property to those who refuse consent 
to its expropriation, since where consent is wanting compensation may 
also be unavailable.25 If some people own everything there are no re- 
sources with which to compensate them. If, for example, some people 
own all of the means of production there seems no way to achieve a 
desirable reform without unjustly ignoring the rights of capital. 
The dilemma is resolved not by ignoring legitimately acquired 
rights or by dismissing justice as a bourgeois legalism but by recognizing 
that the problem arises only so long as the right to private property is 
considered to extend to capital. Since capital constitutes a social structure 
rather than an institution, this extension is misconceived. Control of 
society's productive resources grows out of, but is not a right defined by, 
the generally accepted convention of private property, so that the case in 
which the withdrawal of rights requires impossible compensation does 
not arise. Since, indeed, private control of these resources is defended 
primarily by appeal to an idea of free exchange which is belied by the 
structure of capitalism, domination of public by private interests rests 
upon a counterfactual assumption and is unjust. 
Standard defenses of private property-most of which are entirely 
persuasive-justify not private control of capital but the mechanisms of 
24. Locke, pp. 406, 408. 
25. See Lawrence C. Becker, Property Rights (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1977), p. 117. 
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the market. It bears repeating that free exchange is no offense against 
justice. The exchange of goods and labor in the market mitigates the 
free-rider problems endemic to state socialism. The market provides 
opportunities for a diversity of interests and for the generation of self- 
esteem. It tends to enhance productivity and innovation and it provides 
a very important protection against the authoritarian bureaucracy which 
is encouraged by the existence of a sole employer. And offerings in the 
market seem the only sensitive indicator of demand. As these reasons for 
the institution of private property are extended toward a defense of 
capital, however, they meet offsetting structural reasons for the social 
control of investment in productive resources. 
In practice, confining the market to noncapital goods might prove 
less efficient than any form of regulated or even unregulated capital- 
ism.26 Since the idea has not been sufficiently explored in practice, 
doubts should be tentative, but the matter of efficiency is not central in 
any case. The question of a trade-off between efficiency and democratic 
control is improperly posed, since demands for economic democracy are 
claims ofjustice, whereas efficiency is a measure indifferent to questions 
about the justifiability of domination. The justice of social structures can 
be denied superiority over market considerations only by supposing that 
there are no claims about class interests amenable to objective assess- 
ment. If, however, the claims of economic democracy are justifiable-as 
the view that social structures are subjects of justice contends-liberal 
ignorance of class interests represents a serious shortcoming, and we 
should seek to identify and to satisfy the objectively justifiable interests to 
which considerations of efficiency are, if necessary, rightly subordinated. 
26. See Arthur M. Okun, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 32-64. 
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